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Introduction
The world of wine is frequently cast in terms of a distinction between the 
Old World (the producers of Europe) and the New World (those in USA, 
Australasia, South America and South Africa). Although this is somewhat 
of a false dichotomy,1 it does suggest that New World wine is qualitatively 
different from the Old; it is less constrained by tradition and regulation 
and it is characterized by modern methods of production. Furthermore, 
New World producers – many situated on the periphery of the global 
economy – compete with one another on export markets, differentiating 
their products on the basis of price and style. In this context, New Zealand 
wine producers face stiff competition from Chile and Argentina, as they 
do for a range of commodities that they produce in common, such as fruit 
and forestry products.2
	 At	 first	 glance	 the	wine	 industries	 studied	 here	 seem	quite	 different.	 In	
a quantitative sense the three wine sectors are set apart. Argentina has a 
relatively large population approaching 40 million and this domestic market 
for wine explains why exports remain relatively unimportant there. In Chile 
with a population closer to 20 million, the domestic sector is important. 
Export orientation has been seen as a necessary strategy to break out of 
the	 confines	 of	 the	 domestic	market	 and	 the	wine	 sector	 represents	 a	 very	
clear example of such a strategy. In relative terms New Zealand is small 
with a population of just under four million and, although income per 
capita	is	significantly	higher,	its	relatively	diminutive	size	means	that	export	
orientation has played a central role in the evolution of the sector. Thus, the 
wine industries of the three countries operate at different scales.
 Faced with different factor endowments in both an absolute and relative 
sense, the three countries have had to seek out ways of differentiating 
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their wine on the world market. Although their economies inhabit similar 
competitive spaces in the global economy, this has not necessarily meant 
that they have clashed directly for market access. Instead we have seen the 
evolution of a strategy in the wine sector, and others,3 that resides somewhere 
between co-operation and competition where niche positioning has become 
a dominant strategy. This paper traces the trajectories of change in the wine 
industries of Argentina, Chile and New Zealand and shows that, despite 
divergent historical roots, the three economies now exhibit increasingly 
parallel sectors which actively target globally competitive, yet non-
overlapping spaces. In this sense, we argue there may be further synergies 
to be gained in cooperation rather than competition on the periphery of the 
global wine sector. This contention may bear broader implications that can 
be applied in other sectors and economies in the semi-periphery.
Divergent histories of wine production
At	 first	 sight,	 there	 is	 a	 major	 contrast	 in	 the	 history	 of	 wine	 production	
of Argentina and Chile on one hand and New Zealand on the other. The 
former have had a strong wine producing heritage lasting some 500 years, 
whereas	New	Zealand	wine	was	 virtually	 absent	 for	 the	 first	 120	 years	 of	
European settlement. As noted previously, despite these vast differences in 
their histories as well as their relative sizes, in the past 30 years the industries 
of	 the	 three	 countries	 have	 converged	 in	 some	 significant	ways.
 Wine production followed closely on the heels of the Spanish colonizers of 
South America and found particularly favourable conditions in what became 
Argentina and Chile. Grapes were grown and wine produced on many estates 
in these two countries from the sixteenth century onwards. It was a largely 
domestic product, produced on a small scale on estates and smallholdings 
alike and consumed on or close to its place of production. Exports were 
minimal, production techniques rudimentary and commercialization of the 
industry limited. For many, wine was a household subsistence product. 
The varieties of grapes grown descended from the Spanish colonizers and 
included País and Muscatel in Chile – varieties which grew throughout the 
regions of both countries.
 Although wine production in Chile and Argentina remained in this 
condition for much of the period from the sixteenth to the mid-twentieth 
centuries, some important changes did take place. In Chile the arrival of 
Basque and Huguenot settlers in the nineteenth century – and in Argentina, 
French and Italian migrants at the same time – led to the introduction 
of more classical European grape varieties from pre-phylloxera France: 4 
varieties such as Cabernet Sauvignon, Merlot and Chardonnay which were 
later to become the mainstays of the industry. Some of these immigrants 
also had a more commercial orientation with their production and founded 
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companies such as Ruttini in Mendoza. They began to tap the growing 
domestic market for wine in the expanding towns and cities.
 As the industries expanded in the two countries into the second half 
of the twentieth century, they conformed to the structuralist economic 
philosophies of the time with a strong emphasis on import substitution 
industrialization. Wine was a product that could be produced locally and 
satisfy local demand, obviating the need for foreign imports. Production was 
often on a large scale. Wineries such as Trapiche in Mendoza had large 
industrial-scale factories producing wine in bulk that was railed to centres 
such as Buenos Aires and sold cheaply as a common consumption item for 
urban dwellers. Such wine did include the classical varieties, such as Cabernet 
Sauvignon, but was more often produced using the old-established varieties 
packaged in barrels or large glass containers and as generic red and white 
(mixed variety) wines.5 Economies of scale and low-cost undifferentiated 
mass products characterized an industry very closely wedded to a protected 
domestic market.
 New Zealand, by contrast, had a quite different and much less venerable 
wine industry. Early missionaries and traders tried grape growing from the 
first	 days	 of	 European	 settlement	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century.	 However,	 for	
most of the country’s European history, wine production and consumption 
faced several formidable obstacles including hostile competition from brewing 
firms	 and	 opposition	 from	 temperance	 groups	which	 restricted	 the	 sale	 of	
locally produced wines.6 Only in the 1970s did a local industry begin to 
emerge when a number of companies (notably several from Australia) saw the 
potential	to	sell	wine	(including	fortified	brands	such	as	‘port’	and	‘sherry’)	
made from local grapes. This nascent industry was oriented solely towards 
a domestic market that had very low rates of wine consumption (compared 
to beer and spirits) and what it produced were cheap bulk products that 
derived from high yielding often hybrid varieties of grape. Although popular 
at the time as an alternative alcoholic beverage, these wines tended to be 
sweet	 and	 falsely	modelled	 on	European	 brands	 such	 as	 ‘Hock’,	 ‘Moselle’	
or	‘Burgundy’	even	though	their	constituent	grapes	(much	less	the	resultant	
wines) bore little resemblance to their European originals. Sweeter-style 
white wines, especially made from the Müller Thurgau variety, dominated 
the	market,	often	being	sold	in	three	litre	casks,	just	as	fortified	wines	came	
in half gallon bottles.
 By the late 1970s, therefore, the three countries had begun to converge, 
even though New Zealand had a much smaller scale and much more recent 
wine industry. All three had settled on a formula that focused on the domestic 
market – exports were minimal – and low-cost, high-volume production of 
relatively undifferentiated bulk wine that competed not against European 
wine but against local beer and spirits.
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 Change came in a dramatic fashion in the 1980s and changed the histories 
of all three countries’ wine industries in a similar way. The change resulted 
from the adoption of neoliberal policies in dramatic fashion in each of the 
countries.	This	shift	came	first	to	Chile	following	the	military	coup	of	1973	
led by Pinochet. In ousting the socialist coalition the junta soon reversed the 
structuralist and dependency-inspired policies of Allende and replaced them 
by 1975 with a series of reforms that converted Chile into the most open 
economy in the world. In the rural areas an agrarian counter-reform divided 
up collective land holdings and returned them to former large-scale owners. 
The complete elimination of agricultural subsidies led to harsh competition 
in	the	countryside.	This	led	to	significant	re-orientation	of	production	towards	
external markets. Based on low labour costs, precipitated by deregulation 
in the labour market, Chilean wine competed based on price in the global 
market and began to carve a low-quality niche in that regard. Neoliberalism 
was compounded in the 1980s in Chile after the crisis of 1982 and the export 
model continued to dominate. By this time many smaller-scale farmers had 
been out-competed with large-scale, hacienda-type properties evolving where 
the Chilean wine industry had become increasingly concentrated.
 Of the three countries discussed here the shift to neoliberalism came later 
and	was	 less	enduring	 in	 the	case	of	Argentina.	 Influenced	by	structuralist	
ideas, Peronism principally dominated until 1976 when a coup removed Eva 
Peron as president. The military enacted some deregulation but the reforms 
were in no way as complete as they were in Chile. The return to democracy 
following the fall of General Galtieri in 1983 paved the way for the 
democratically-elected administration of Alfonsín which enacted a number 
of policy shifts based on IMF insistence. These had devastating impacts 
in the countryside. In Argentina initial neoliberal restructuring was deeply 
unpopular and the eventual currency crisis of 1989 led to the replacement 
of Alfonsín by the more overtly neoliberal Menem. Menem was a Peronist 
but his privatizations and free market reforms were intended to model the 
outward orientation of the newly democratic Chile where growth had been 
rapid. The Argentinean economy became increasingly export-oriented and 
this had an impact in the wine sector which declined in the newly-opened 
competitive landscape.
 In Chile and Argentina, the decline brought about by neoliberalism in 
the wine sector in the 1980s was apparent. Local industries were outclassed 
in	 terms	of	higher	quality	and	more	diversified	imports	and	 the	strategy	of	
exports based on low labour costs and hence price gave both industries a 
poor international reputation. In Argentina in particular, local production 
began to fall and the area planted in vineyards dropped, whilst in Chile it, 
at best, stagnated. Unlike New Zealand, wine in Chile and Argentina could 
survive in the face of competition from imports, for local production costs 
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remained very low but, without government protection and subsidies, it was 
forced into a lowly position in the market with tight margins and changing 
consumer preferences towards higher quality more expensive wines. Figure 1 
shows the changes in area under vineyards in the three countries. For New 
Zealand, there was a slight dip in the late 1980s before some recovery but 
in Argentina the decline in area extended well into the next decade.
Figure 1: Surface area under vineyard, 000s hectares, Argentina, Chile 
and New Zealand 1986-2007
Source: oiv (2011), also overton and Murray (2011), see note 17.
 In New Zealand the move to neoliberalism came with a suddenness that 
matched the other two – although it was marked by the difference that it 
took place under democracy rather than dictatorship. In late 1984, the former 
Muldoon administration (which had stuck to strong protectionist policies and 
economic regulation) was replaced by the Lange Labour government. The 
incoming administration quickly introduced widespread economic reforms 
that ended most forms of government protection for agriculture, lowered 
import	 tariffs,	 and	 floated	 the	 exchange	 and	 interest	 rates.	 The	 immediate	
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result was a crisis for the rural sector with land values falling. For the wine 
industry it was equally traumatic. Imports of wine, especially from Australia, 
introduced consumers to wine that was both different, better and yet just 
as cheap. Local wines struggled. An even greater crisis for the industry 
that had hit the dairy and livestock sectors was partially averted when the 
government	 sponsored	 a	 ‘vine-pull’	 scheme	 in	1986,	paying	grape	growers	
to uproot their vines and seek alternative crops.7 The New Zealand wine 
industry seemed poised for substantial decline, even oblivion.
Recovery and the new neoliberalism 
– value-added export orientation
What saved the wine industries of the three countries was a similar, 
though slightly differently-timed and structured, turn away from domestic 
orientation based on price to export orientation which sought to add value 
through quality and specialization.8	 This	 has	 been	 termed	 ‘upgrading’	 by	
several authors.9 In some ways this can be conceptualized as a second 
phase	 in	neoliberal	 restructuring	once	 the	 impacts	of	 the	 ‘easy’	 large	scale	
bulk export phase had been exhausted. Some have characterized this policy 
adjustment as a shift towards neostructuralism, whereas others have termed it 
an adjustment necessary to perpetuate the neoliberal mode of accumulation. 
In the wine industry the need to move beyond low-cost activity came only 
when it was realized that much of the rest of the world did not want the 
sort	 of	 cheap	 ‘plonk’	 that	 they	had	hitherto	 been	producing	 in	 bulk.	What	
did	 begin	 to	 sell	 well,	 in	 very	 small	 quantities	 at	 first,	 were	 distinctive,	
freshly-flavoured,	 reasonably	 priced	wines	made	 from	 recognizable	 classic	
European varieties.
 It was not until the democratic period of the 1990s that wine export really 
took off in Chile when the neoliberal model was augmented by a new desire 
to add value to exports.10	 In	 this	 regard,	 there	 was	 a	 significant	 effort	 to	
improve the quality of Chilean wines. As we see later in this paper, this also 
involved an explicit effort to differentiate production from other New World 
producers, through the cultivation of red wine varieties and in particular 
Carménère. As Argentina has not undergone a land reform similar to that 
which took place in Chile, many of the large estates that had thrived under 
colonialism and persisted in the import substitution industrialization (ISI) 
period remained and these became the basis for the newly outward oriented 
industry based on quality. Increasingly, however, and to a greater extent than 
was the case in Chile, foreign capital, particularly from Spain, entered the 
economy to exploit Argentina’s considerable comparative advantage in wine 
production based on a range of increasingly specialized and high-quality 
wines as well as relatively low labour and land costs.
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 For Argentina, it was the American market that was important. Here 
Chardonnay or Cabernet Sauvignon wines could be sold at a very competitive 
price to an alternative from California. Importantly, these wines were 
marketed in a similar way to Californian wine: they used varietal labelling 
rather than confusing European regional branding (Burgundy, Bordeaux 
or Rioja) and they also seemed to offer an evenness of quality from one 
vintage to the next. Chile straddled both the UK and USA markets,11 whilst 
New Zealand looked more to the UK market where it found, almost by 
accident, a niche. Australian wine had been successful on the UK market 
in a similar way to Chile and Argentina: good value, even quality, simple 
varietal wines. What distinguished the New Zealand niche in that market 
was a particular variety – Sauvignon Blanc – that was being produced from 
the Marlborough region that offered a highly distinctive and uncomplicated 
flavour	 profile.
Quantitative shifts in production and export of wine 
– new markets in the Old World
These export imperatives drove the industries in new directions. Decline was 
arrested in New Zealand at virtually the same time as the vine pull. Indeed 
some growers may have taken the opportunity to take the government subsidy 
to remove their old vines of varieties such as Müller Thurgau when others 
(or, perhaps, even they themselves) chose to plant or replant in varieties such 
as Chardonnay and Sauvignon Blanc. In Chile, there was decline in some 
areas but the presence already of classic varieties made the shift to export 
production somewhat easier. In Argentina, however, the decline was more 
marked and the recovery slower.
 An already well-supplied domestic market seemed to be shifting to 
more sophisticated tastes and dabbling with imported wines. Overseas, 
though, there were literally millions of wine consumers seeking good value 
alternatives to French, Italian, Spanish and Californian wines. Figure 2 shows 
how the production of wine in the three countries shifted markedly towards 
exports during the 1990s and 2000s. Exports accounted for nearly all the 
growth of the industries in the three countries, while domestic consumption 
of local wines was sluggish at best, and declining at worst. The expansion 
of	the	wine	industries	of	the	three	countries	in	the	first	decade	of	the	2000s	
has been remarkable. Area planted in grapes has risen in all cases (see 
Figure 1) and wine production and exports have risen in step (Figures 2, 3 
and 4).
 Although the expansion of New Zealand wine production was relatively 
more dramatic than the other two, globally it remained a small player.12 
Nonetheless New Zealand wine exports revealed an important export strategy. 
The New Zealand Wine Institute, the industry body, was determined that the 
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Figure 2: Wine exports and production in New Zealand, millions litres, 
1989-2009
Source: oiv (2011)
Figure 3: Wine exports and production in Chile, millions litres, 
1989-2009
Source: oiv (2011)
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New Zealand wine brand should be associated with quality and relatively 
high prices. Indeed, for many years, New Zealand wine could claim to 
receive the highest average price per bottle on the UK market. This strategy 
depended on its niche as a producer of distinctive varietal-based wines: wines 
which were sold only in bottles, not in bulk containers such as casks, and 
wines	 that	were	 always	 identified	by	variety	 and	year	 (as	well	 as	 country),	
not	generic	 ‘mixed’	variety/vintage	products.	However,	 this	 latter	 approach	
did not suit the other two, especially Chile.13 It found that it could compete 
well in markets such as the USA and UK with good value varietal wines 
whilst	also,	as	a	very	efficient	producer	of	low	cost	wine,	shipping	much	of	
its wine in bulk to emerging markets such as China14 where it could tempt 
new wine consumers with a cheap but reasonable-quality product. Argentina 
was similarly engaged in bulk wine production but it began to realize some 
real	 benefits	 from	moving	 towards	 the	upper	 end	of	 the	market.15
 As an interesting footnote to the export of bottled and bulk wine from 
the three countries, we have seen trade occur amongst the three and there 
has	 been	 some	 ‘co-production’.	 Although	New	Zealand	wine	 consumption	
has been fairly static, some local wine companies have found that very high 
demand for their products overseas has led to shortfalls in their portfolio 
of wines offered domestically, particularly at the lower end of the market. 
Figure 4: Wine exports and production in Argentina, millions litres, 
1995-2009
Source: oiv (2011)
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Anxious to maintain supplies to their local retailers and also capitalize on 
their brand locally, companies have occasionally blended New Zealand wine 
with	 that	 from	 South	America.	 Although	 identified	 as	 such	 in	 small	 print	
on their labels, the passing off of imported wine from Chile under a New 
Zealand wine brand, represents an interesting example of how the wines of 
the countries can be complementary – good value South American red wine 
can help New Zealand wine companies retain market share domestically. This 
represents one example of co-opetition upon which we expand below.
Qualitative shifts in production and export of wine 
– Old World varieties made new
A number of qualitative shifts have accompanied the aggregate growth of the 
industries and the turn to more intense and value-added export production, 
resulting in parallel transformations. These have involved marked changes 
in the varietal mixes of the national vineyards, the emergence of signature 
wines and both regional spread and deepening.
 With the turn from domestic and low-cost export to value added export-
orientation or neostructuralism has come a major change in the mix of 
varieties grown (Figures 5, 6, 7). There are two key trends to observe here. 
First, is the decline in all three cases of the old bulk varieties (País and 
Muscatel in Chile; Pedro Giménez and Torrontes Riojano in Argentina; and 
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Figure 5: Land area by wine grape variety (hectares) Argentina
Source: oiv (2011)
Between Competition and Co‑operation
181
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
M
ull
er
 Th
ur
ga
u
Ca
be
rn
et
 sa
uv
ign
on
M
er
lot
Pin
ot
 N
oir
Ch
ar
do
nn
ay
Sa
uv
ign
on
 bl
an
c
1992
2001
2009
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
Pa
is
Ca
be
rn
et
 sa
uv
ign
on
M
er
lot
Ca
rm
en
er
e
Ch
ar
do
nn
ay
Sa
uv
ign
on
 bl
an
c
1994
2001
2007
Figure 6: Land area by wine grape variety (hectares) Chile
Source: oiv (2011)
Figure 7: Land area by wine grape variety (hectares) New Zealand
Source: oiv (2011)
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Müller Thurgau in New Zealand – virtually none of which was exported) 
to be replaced by a range of classical varieties, including Chardonnay, 
Cabernet Sauvignon, Merlot and Pinot Noir, increasingly in demand from 
both international and domestic consumers. In New Zealand, for example, 
we can see that Müller Thurgau has fallen from over 20% of the national 
vineyard in 1990 to a bare 0.25% twenty years later. In Chile, País declined 
from 13.8% in 1994 to 8.2% in 2007. Chardonnay is perhaps the most 
ubiquitous	 of	 the	 classical	 varieties	 and	was	 one	 of	 the	 first	 to	 emerge	 in	
all three cases – a pattern matched by Cabernet Sauvignon.
 Particularly interesting to note as a second trend has been the emergence 
of signature varieties. These have been different in each case but in all 
they have come to identify the wines of Chile, Argentina and New Zealand 
globally. For New Zealand it has been Sauvignon Blanc. This variety of 
wine made in a particular style has neatly come to symbolize the brand 
of	 New	 Zealand	 wine	 as	 fresh,	 vibrant,	 distinctive	 and	 ‘clean’.	 Produced	
in	 the	 Marlborough	 region	 it	 seems	 to	 develop	 a	 flavour	 profile	 that	 it	 is	
virtually unique – it has proved almost impossible to replicate these exact 
flavours	in	other	regions	or	countries.	The	enormous	success	of	Marlborough	
Sauvignon Blanc has fundamentally driven the expansion of the New Zealand 
industry in the past twenty years. Over this time there has been a change 
from when Marlborough accounted for 28.8% and Sauvignon Blanc 12.9% 
of the country’s wine production in 1992 to 48.9% and 50.7% respectively 
in 2009. This dominance of a single variety and a single region has been 
associated with impressive rates of growth and development, yet it is also 
now showing signs of a dangerous over-dependence.16
 Whilst not as dramatic as Marlborough Sauvignon Blanc, Chile and 
Argentina have similarly developed signature wines. In Chile, a quirk of 
nature and history resulted in the rediscovery of a variety – Carménère 
– that was thought to have virtually been wiped out by phylloxera in its 
native France in the nineteenth century.17 It was not recognized as this 
variety in Chile – being thought of as a type of Merlot – until genetic 
testing established it as such in the mid 1990s. Since then, the ability of 
phylloxera-free Chile to produce this variety has given it a product that is 
highly distinctive and one that is sought by consumers wanting an alternative 
to similar Bordeaux-style red wines. As a result, planting of new Carménère 
vineyards has proceeded apace. It is still a long way from replacing the 
dominant Cabernet Sauvignon and Merlot varieties which form the bulk of 
Chilean	 red	wine	 exports;	 it	 does	 not	 contribute	 significantly	 to	 the	 lower-
price end of the market but, rather, it is what champions Chilean red wines 
at the upper end.
	 Similarly,	 the	wines	of	Argentina	are	 increasingly	 identified	globally	by	
red wines, in particular the Malbec variety from Mendoza. Like Carménère, 
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this	 is	 a	 minor	 Bordeaux	 variety	 but	 one	 which	 seems	 to	 find	 particular	
expression elsewhere. Mendoza winemakers, backed by expert overseas 
advisors such as Michel Rolland, have tried to, and largely succeeded in, 
developing this variety as a singular high quality wine. Again it helps 
establish Argentinian wine with a distinctive place on the crowded shelves of 
wine retailers worldwide. As with Chilean Carménère, it is not as dominant 
in the country’s vineyards as Marlborough Sauvignon Blanc but its rise is 
highly	 significant.
 This varietal re-orientation of the respective wine economies presents an 
interesting economic strategy based on the distinctive geographies. As New 
World exporters, each of the economies has come to inhabit overlapping 
competitive space in the global wine market. The witting development of 
signature varieties that exploit the particularity of place take the production 
‘upscale’	and	prevent	a	head-on	clash	of	interests.	The	carving	out	of	these	
niches can be seen as an attempt to establish parallel lines in the same 
lucrative markets. These products are complementary as New World success 
in	 one	 variety	 from	 one	 particular	 country	 helps	 raise	 the	 profile	 of	 the	
others. It is in this sense that we can interpret the recent evolution of the 
Southern hemisphere as characterized by competition and cooperation at 
the same time – or co-opetiton.18 Whilst each of these signature ranges has 
come to be associated with the respective producing countries and in some 
ways to be indicative of the geography of those places, each is in fact a 
classic European variety that has been transplanted, adapted and sold back 
to	 the	 ‘core’	of	 the	world	market.	This	 interesting	 reversal	of	 the	direction	
of	economic	flows	says	something	about	the	reconfiguration	of	the	core	and	
periphery in the world economy as old geographies are made new.
Geographic shifts in the production of wine 
– new regional specializations
Another aspect of these transformations in all three countries has been the 
changing	 geography	of	wine	 production,	 involving	 both	 intensification	 and	
expansion. The moves to quality export production, the adoption of classical 
varieties and the search for higher quality products have had immediate 
spatial implications. The former regime of cheap bulk-wine production for 
the domestic production suited certain environments, especially those with 
fertile soils, good water availability and warm temperatures. Here high 
yields of grapes could lower production costs and ensure constant supply. 
This	 suited	 regions	 such	 as	 the	 flat	 alluvial	 soils	 found	 variously	 in	 the	
Central Valley of Chile (around places such as Curicó and Rancagua), the 
plains of Hawke’s Bay and Gisborne in New Zealand and the lower irrigated 
plains around Mendoza in Argentina. However, premium wine production 
has demanded different terroir. Grape vines which have to struggle more 
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in poorer soils, in places where water is not always abundant or where 
temperature variations are greater are thought to produce more intense and 
concentrated	 fruit	 flavours.	Yields	 are	 lower	 but	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 juice	 is	
deemed to produce better and more distinctive wines.
 The search for such favourable environments for high-quality grape 
production	has	led	to	significant	development	of	core	wine-producing	regions.	
Marlborough has developed over the past 30 years from a region where 
almost no grapes were grown at all to a highly specialized wine region 
where vineyards dominate the landscape.19 It is matched in Chile though not 
to quite the same extent. The Colchagua region has become associated with 
quality red wine production (along with the Maipo Valley) and expansion 
of vineyard area there has been marked. In Argentina, the Mendoza region 
continues to dominate the country’s industry20 but within this large region 
there have been differences with higher sub-regions such as the Uco Valley 21 
(with	less	fertile	soils	and	cooler	climates)	experiencing	significant	expansion	
whilst others have been steady or declined. Furthermore, within these core 
regions and subregions there have been some important and more subtle 
changes. Matching the search for favourable regions has been a quest to 
find	 the	 best	 sites:	 vineyards	 situated	 on	 particular	 patches	 of	 soil,	 or	 in	
microclimates or on slopes with a particular orientation to the sun. Whether 
in Marlborough, Colchagua or Mendoza, there has been the gradual shift of 
the	premium	vineyards	away	from	the	alluvial	flats	towards	steeper	hillsides	
and particular sites.
 Finally, in terms of geographical expression, there has been a development 
of completely new wine regions in the past 30 years. This has resulted often 
from the development of new varieties that seem to suit particular places 
more than the former traditionally-cultivated regions. There are examples 
in all three countries. In Chile, the development of the Casablanca region 
between the major cities of Valaparaíso and Santiago has been notable.22 
This region which grew very few grapes formerly has a cooler climate than 
the Central Valley and has been found to produce white grape varieties of 
very good quality, in particular Chardonnay and Sauvignon Blanc. Flavour 
intensity is greater than in the warmer regions and Casablanca has become 
the centre of Chile’s premium white wine production. In New Zealand, the 
Pinot Noir variety has become the country’s main red wine variety but this 
seems to suit cooler and more marginal climates than the Hawke’s Bay 
region, hitherto the dominant region for red (principally Bordeaux style) wine 
production in the country. Pinot Noir has succeeded in a number of cooler 
minor regions, such as Martinborough and Waipara, as well as Marlborough. 
However, it is in the country’s southern-most region in Central Otago that 
Pinot	 Noir	 has	 come	 to	 find	 a	 particular	 home.	 As	 with	 Casablanca,	 the	
expansion of grape growing has been recent and dramatic: in 1992 there 
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were just 25 hectares planted in grapes in Central Otago but by 2009 there 
were 1532 hectares. Furthermore, the concentration on Pinot Noir has been 
exceptional: 78% of the 2009 area was planted in this variety – the most 
specialized wine region in New Zealand. In Argentina, a parallel example 
of new region development can be found in the Uco Valley. This is not an 
entirely new region but it is noticeable that the upper reaches of this area 
to the south of the town of Tunpungato have seen considerable expansion 
with a number of new and modern wineries producing Malbec and other 
premium varieties.23
 Thus given the shift to more geographically-distinct varieties we have seen 
both	‘upscaling’	in	production	where	smaller	and	more	specialized	levels	of	
production in unique places are developed24 together with an expansion of the 
wine production frontier, and often the agricultural frontier more generally, 
into formerly unexploited territory. This is an example of the evolution of 
parallel regional economies within national territories in ways that prevent 
wine producing places from clashing in competitive space. This mirrors the 
process of heterogenization that is happening at the global level discussed 
in the previous section.
Capital and labour – new modes of production 
from old and new sources
The expansion of the wine industries of Chile, Argentina and New Zealand 
have demanded new methods of production and new sources of land, labour 
and capital. To some extent, these have come from the well-established 
resources of existing companies and communities. But in many cases they 
have required new sources to be tapped with capital and even labour coming 
from overseas. In this way, these wine producing regions on the periphery 
of the global economy have been linked to the centre not just through the 
flow	of	wines	to	the	markets	of	Europe	and	North	America	but	also	through	
the	 reverse	flow	of	capital	 to	 invest	 in	places	 that	are	now	part	of	a	global	
portfolio of wine brands for international beverage corporations.
	 New	Zealand	has	seen	perhaps	the	most	significant	involvement	of	global	
capital. For many years, the expansion of the industry in New Zealand was 
driven	 by	 a	 small	 number	 of	 local	 companies.	 The	 most	 significant	 was	
Montana. This company grew rapidly and gradually absorbed its rivals, in 
particular the Corbans group in 2000. By this time it had come to account 
for over half of the country’s production. However, Montana soon succumbed 
to foreign interests as it sought to both expand its production and secure 
access	to	overseas	markets.	It	sold	first	to	Allied	Domecq,	which	was	in	turn	
bought out by the giant Pernod Ricard group.25 Also prominent in the New 
Zealand industry is the Constellation Brands stable of brands and the Louis 
Vuitton Moët Hennessey (LVMH) group which owns the iconic Cloudy Bay 
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brand. In Argentina, as noted previously, the imprint of foreign investment 
is also noticeable. There are French, Spanish and American companies 
who have invested heavily in the Mendoza region and are at the forefront 
of the Malbec development and its marketing worldwide. In Chile, foreign 
companies	such	as	Torres,	Château	Lafite	and	Robert	Mondavi	are	found,26 
adding Chilean Carménère and other premium red wines to the stable of 
brands. However, in neither Argentina nor particularly Chile is the extent 
of foreign investment and ownership of the wine industry as widespread 
as in New Zealand. Local companies, such as Montes in Chile27 retain a 
prominent place. Nonetheless, the incorporation of wineries and vineyards 
from all three in the investment portfolios of major global wine and beverage 
companies	 does	 reflect	 the	 closer	 integration	 of	 the	 industry	 worldwide.	
It also creates common interests and a likely increase in coordination in 
terms	of	 the	way	national	 industries	are	diversified	in	parallel	 in	 the	future	
in terms of wine styles.
 A further aspect of capital investment in all three countries is the 
presence of new local capital. Alongside long-established wine companies 
and investors is a breed of investors in the industry that have generated 
wealth from outside the industry but sought to invest in wine perhaps as a 
way of attaching themselves and their reputations to a glamorous industry, 
sometimes far removed from their main source of wealth in sectors such as 
retailing, banking or in one spectacular Chilean example, arms dealing.28 
To an extent, these local forms of capital act alongside global capital to 
invest	 in,	and	profit	from,	 the	establishment	and	consolidation	of	new	wine	
regions which trade on notions of terroir29 and regional distinctiveness.30
 The demand for labour in the wine industry has grown not only because 
of the absolute growth of the industry but also because the qualitative shift 
has demanded more labour-intensive methods, such as hand picking of 
grapes, hand pruning of vines and more intensive wine making techniques. 
In these cases mechanization has been supplemented by deliberate use of 
more intensive use of manual labour, whether of the unskilled (harvesting and 
pruning) or skilled (winemaking) forms. In South America, this heightened 
demand for labour has been met from existing sources, seemingly from local 
rural labourers or migrant labour gangs that mix involvement in the wine 
industry with other rural sector work or their own subsistence holdings. 
The extent to which the wine industry contributes new livelihood options 
and better prospects for these groups on one hand, or, alternatively, merely 
exploits this cheap pool of labour is yet unclear and begs further research. 
In New Zealand, however, the demand for labour in the vineyards has 
long outstripped local supply. Contract labour gangs from Southeast Asia 
are often used to supplement local seasonal labour during harvesting and 
pruning seasons. Notably, however, the high demand and importance of 
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the industry has spurred a degree of government support in the form of a 
seasonal migrant labour scheme that promotes the recruitment of workers 
from	Pacific	 Islands	 to	work	 in	New	Zealand	vineyards	 and	 farms.31
 It is perhaps interesting to note that whilst there is no obvious connection 
or competition in terms of unskilled labour in the three wine industries, 
there is a thread of labour that does appear across them. Winemakers are 
sought after worldwide and those from the New World are often seen as 
being at the vanguard of modern techniques and the production of desired 
wine	styles.	These	are	people	who	become	‘flying	winemakers’32 overseeing 
vintages	 in	different	parts	of	 the	world.	Thus	 it	 is	not	uncommon	 to	find	a	
New Zealander making Sauvignon Blanc in Casablanca or Chilean trainee 
winemakers working in Marlborough.
Conclusions
The wine sectors of Argentina, Chile and New Zealand have divergent 
histories	and	are	significantly	different	in	terms	of	their	factor	endowments.	
However, they have come to occupy parallel competitive spaces in the 
contemporary economy. Although the three sectors are of a different scale 
these divergent antecedents have not prevented the coming together of the 
sectors. Beginning in the 1960s there was a shift to structuralist-informed ISI 
and then later, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, to unfettered neoliberalism. 
This later development shifted the industries in concert from ones which 
were characterized by relatively large-scale bulk production for domestic 
markets to ones that focused on low-price export orientation. The rolling out 
of neoliberalism across the countryside had a very negative impact on the 
wine industry in all three cases. What is particularly remarkable is that all 
three bounced back from this to become successful exporters with positive 
reputations on the global markets.
	 As	 the	 ‘easy’	phase	of	neoliberalism	became	exhausted	 in	 each	country	
there was a witting shift to strategies of value-added production, sometimes 
termed	 neostructuralism.	 This	 occurred	 first	 and	 most	 rapidly	 in	 New	
Zealand around the end of the 1980s. In the mid-1990s there was a qualitative 
shift in Chile and later Argentina emulated the success of the former. 
This shift in productive orientation was characterized particularly by the 
move to specialized varieties that came to signify particular countries and, 
increasingly, regions within those countries. Ironically, the varieties were 
classic European grapes. This development saw the evolution of parallel 
sectors competing for the same global space but in ways that did not directly 
overlap. At the same time other forms of co-operative activity including 
research and development, winemaking, and bulk blending occurred. Below 
the national scale we also began to see a crystallizing of national space 
into more specialized regions, each producing signature varieties based on 
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investment from both embedded local capital and increasingly footloose yet 
coordinated global sources.
 The outcome of these competitive shifts has been the development of three 
very successful export sectors in terms of the quantity and quality of exports. 
Although their scale is vastly different, the trajectory has been remarkably 
similar in outline form – yet the details of the respective evolution vary. 
Growth has been most impressive in Chile and New Zealand, whereas in 
Argentina the relatively large internal market means that exports are of 
less	 significance.	However,	 the	 sectors	have	helped	diversify	 these	primary	
product-dependent countries away from over-reliance on one or two products 
– a situation that characterized them all during the colonial period and in 
the immediate postcolonial times. Furthermore, success in one wine sector 
has had a demonstration effect and led to complementary outcomes in the 
others – as the reputation of New World wines rises in one place, others enjoy 
positive externalities. One caveat to this broadly positive story is important, 
however;	whether	these	beneficial	macroeconomic	impacts	have	flowed	down	
to labour and the localities that host the newly vibrant wine sectors is an 
open question and should form the basis for further research.
 Overall, the parallel evolution of the three sectors has led to a dialectical 
process common in the context of globalization whereby an increasingly 
homogenized global market has stimulated the creation of increasingly 
heterogeneous space. This has been achieved by investment from a 
combination of local and global capital that has worked in concert to ensure 
this parallelism through the development of niche-based production systems 
that trade on their geographical distinctiveness at successive scales. This 
complementary differentiation suggests that parallel sectors that do not 
clash can be carved from economies that should intuitively compete where 
purposeful intervention and co-operation is encouraged. This assertion 
may be true for sectors beyond the wine industry and should therefore be 
explored as a way forward for further interaction in the context of these 
three Southern hemisphere economies.
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